

**When cooperation induces a public good.**

**Fisheries management in the spirit of Elinor Ostrom.**

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**Abstract** *The motivation for the paper is inspired by the real-world cases in fisheries management that contradict many of the theoretical models. This is the case where strong fishing communities manage to cooperate even with a large set of players. This paper presents an explanation by introducing the idea of co-management in fisheries management where the partition structure (for example in terms of social pressure) affects the payoffs of the players. It combines different modeling contributions and thereby creates a new framework for understanding co-management with cooperation in fishing communities. The structure of the model is a repeated coalition game with the possibility to deviate combined with introduction of a variation of a club good model. The club good is introduced as an information flow in the coalition, which implies acting as a singleton is costlier compared to collusion. The paper presents a hybrid of the cooperative fisheries management with the non-cooperative and the club good literature. The model provides a more optimistic view of coalition formation and can be an explanatory setup for cases of strong fishing communities resulting in cooperation even with a large set of players.*